In summary: I have argued that Owens's solution to cases of harmless wronging fails to be explanatory, and has implausible consequences for his theory of wrongs.
(1) In this article, I am only concerned with the relational form of wrong that involves one agent's wronging another (e.g., A's wronging B).
(10) Owens maintains, against this, that cases of harmless wronging show that, "For analytical purposes, the central cases...
(16) Defenders of interest-based theories might also argue that, in the cases of purportedly " harmless" wronging under consideration, we in fact have noninstrumental interests in having control over what happens (to us or to our property), and that these interests will be set by the act in question.
I merely want to make clear that IH would seem to presuppose a form of consequentialism about wronging. It does seem, however, that nonconsequentialists will have more resources to motivate views that do not endorse IH.