Seemings are sometimes overridden by other considerations that block the generation or reinforcement of belief.
Because the conflicting seemings are evenly balanced, Ernie withholds judgment.
Although Bert is subject to conflicting seemings, he is not at all inclined to believe that Ernie is both angry and not angry.
e, prima facie seemings from seemings all-things-considered.
Because there is no belief-analogue to a prima facie seeming, the distinction between prima facie and all-things-considered seemings reveals another contrast between seemings and beliefs.
Thus far I have assumed that seemings provide psychological and epistemic support for belief, but this could be questioned.
The case used to motivate the distinction between mere appearances and seemings is a defeated appearance.
Peripheral appearances can be registered in memory as part of a memory of a more inclusive experience and sometimes causally and epistemically support the formation of belief at later times via memorial seemings.
In Bert's case a seeming results in a felt inclination to believe but not in belief itself.
Unlike mere appearances, seemings inclines one to believe their propositional content.
In seemings one experiences believing to be demanded or required.
Those who, like Bert, are faced with conflicting seemings experience conflicting demands and, as a result, may become self-consciously aware of the conflicting seemings.
A variation on case III shows that there can be felt demands to believe that are not associated with seemings.
Unlike the felt moral demand the felt demand associated with seemings is grounded an epistemic feature that I shall call "felt veridicality.
The real difference between seemings and other states that can incline one to believe their content is that seemings have the feel of truth, the feel of a state whose content reveals how things really are.