(1.) I leave open the question of whether token identities are possible, ie., of whether it is possible for a particular seeming to be token identical with a particular belief.
Nonetheless, these desires and beliefs are distinct mental states from the seemings they influence.
(5.) The account is formulated for de dicto seemings. It could also be used for de re seemings in which o seems [Phi] to S.
Most work on the nature of seemings has focussed on perception and, to a lesser extent, memory.
Seemings are intentional states because they have propositional content.
Though seemings are intimately related to beliefs, they constitute a distinct mental state type because it may seem to S that p even though S does not believe that p.(1) The connection between seeming and belief is both epistemic and causal: when it seems to S that o is [Phi], S is in a mental state that would, under appropriate circumstances, causally and epistemically support S's believing that o is [Phi].
A good place to begin the connection of seeming with belief is with an ordinary case in which seeming leads to new beliefs and reinforces old ones.
Sam's visual experience is a seeming whose content is that there is a puddle and bust of Dr.
The first is that seemings require the presence of doubt and hence it is inappropriate to say that it seems to Sam that there is a puddle ahead of her.
But there does seem to be an important class of seemings and beliefs that are in the same boat, namely many inductive ones.
our beliefs and seemings are arguably fully explained by these facts.
One might instead conclude that these beliefs and seemings are subject to defeat because they satisfy these critera.
These examples illustrate the criteria satisfaction of which Bedke takes to be sufficient to generate the defeater against intuitions, and more generally against any seeming or belief.
otherwise, practically any seeming or belief would be defeated.