The upshot of all this is that the sceptic can insist that the proper execution principle only allows x, assuming that x is not maundering, a warrant for the biconditional belief that he was not maundering if and only if he pinched himself The conditionalizing sceptic will claim that at no time did x acquire a warrant for the belief that he pinched himself, and similarly neither did he acquire a warrant for the belief that he was not maundering, and that therefore the proper execution of the procedure will not ground any of his beliefs.
If x and t are arbitrary, then it is at least possible that x is maundering at t, and therefore possible that he or she might be incapable of just the sort of competent intellection required for that move.
If x is not maundering, then he or she has a warrant for believing that, for appropriate Q, if he or she has a warrant for believing it, then he or she is not maundering at that time.
Even in the best case imaginable, x is maundering at t.
Hence, whether or not x is maundering at t, x cannot have warrant to believe both P1** and O2** simultaneously', and hence the SOA, devastating though its conclusion undoubtedly is, should never impress anyone.
If P1** and O2** are both true, then everyone is always maundering and competent intellection is impossible.