Why shouldn't the following be the epistemological case: x pinches himself, such action providing him with both the warrant that he is not maundering and the warrant that he did not dream that he pinched himself while in a maundering state?
Then, according to the sceptic, he is now warranted in believing that, if he is not maundering, then he pinched himself The sceptic will also allow that it is a plausible principle that if x wishes to establish that he is not maundering, and therefore pinches himself in order to carry out a procedure designed to establish that he is not maundering, and feels that pinch, then he is not maundering.
The upshot of all this is that the sceptic can insist that the proper execution principle only allows x, assuming that x is not maundering, a warrant for the biconditional belief that he was not maundering if and only if he pinched himself The conditionalizing sceptic will claim that at no time did x acquire a warrant for the belief that he pinched himself, and similarly neither did he acquire a warrant for the belief that he was not maundering, and that therefore the proper execution of the procedure will not ground any of his beliefs.
If x and t are arbitrary, then it is at least possible that x is maundering at t, and therefore possible that he or she might be incapable of just the sort of competent intellection required for that move.
If x is not maundering, then he or she has a warrant for believing that, for appropriate Q, if he or she has a warrant for believing it, then he or she is not maundering at that time.
Even in the best case imaginable, x is maundering at t.
Hence, whether or not x is maundering at t, x cannot have warrant to believe both P1** and O2** simultaneously', and hence the SOA, devastating though its conclusion undoubtedly is, should never impress anyone.