hypothetical imperative

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a principle stating the action required to attain a desired goal

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Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?
In Kantian terms, we interpret the NAP as a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one.
As I have argued elsewhere, this way of thinking of the effect of instrumental reasoning does not get us to an adequate conception of the hypothetical imperative, that is, to a normative principle of instrumental reason.
Hypothetical imperatives are conditional, and thus not binding if one objects to the condition.
Hypothetical imperatives are no less imperatives for being hypothetical.
Utilitarianism is only one moral system justified by the hypothetical imperative; a more rational argument can be made for a system that utilizes the hypothetical imperative but does not have as its primary goal the maximization of societal wealth and happiness (although these may be byproducts of that system).
Even though it is in my nature to want to be happy, the application of the requirement expressed by an imperative of prudence is still dependent on an end that I have-if I did not want to seek my own happiness, I would have no reason to do what the hypothetical imperative of prudence instructed that I ought to do.
In effect, medicine decided to adopt as a methodological rule the following hypothetical imperative 'In order to cure diseases, prevent diseases, and so on (a list of specific aim may be substituted), then adopt and employ the methods and theories of the natural sciences'.
Assuming that desires are simply given, and that some account of theoretical reason is in place, the ultimate justification for a hypothetical imperative will be a statement that isolates the causal connection between an action contemplated and the outcome desired.
Similarly, given Kant's scant attention to happiness in the Groundwork, Allison Hills' 'Happiness in the Groundwork' (Chapter 2), which considers Kant's distinctive desire-satisfaction theory of happiness, the kind of end that happiness is, and the status of the imperatives of prudence as assertoric hypothetical imperatives (rather than problematic hypothetical imperatives or categorical imperatives), sheds light on an important topic all too easy to overlook.
Hypothetical imperatives appear in the form of "if you want x to happen, do y.
presents intentional action descriptions (expressing a "conative [volitional] propositional attitude about actions in one's best interests") as a prelude to a reconstruction of Kantian hypothetical imperatives of prudence, concluding with moral implications in light of a formal, semantical.
In Chapter 4, Sedgwick offers an account of categorical and hypothetical imperatives that seems to lose sight of the essential difference between the two kinds of imperatives.
In this paper, I first examine a key passage in which Kant systematically discusses the role of conscience, then give a systematic account of 'indirect' duties and the function of hypothetical imperatives in the course of their generation.
According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take the means or don't have the end.