On the other hand, the statute specifically provided for an `expurgatory oath'(101) whereby a juror who expressed bias could still be qualified.(102) Specifically, "the previous expression or formation of an opinion or impression in reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant" no longer constituted a ground for challenge if the juror "declare[d] on oath, that he believe[d] that such opinion or impression [would] not influence his verdict, and that he [could] render an impartial verdict according to the evidence."(103) The statute, however, did not leave the trial judge without discretion, providing that such a juror could be disqualified notwithstanding the expurgatory oath if the trial court were not satisfied that the "opinion or impression ...
People,(105) the New York Court of Appeals held that this statutory scheme was constitutional, reasoning that the expurgatory oath sufficiently satisfied the defendant's right to an impartial jury.(106) Subsequent appellate courts, however, proved willing to look beyond the words of the oath and to hold that reversible error occurred when a prospective juror's testimony obviously lacked credibility.
Subsequent decisions also evinced a willingness to look beyond the fact that a prospective juror had uttered an expurgatory oath.
With the grant of appellate authority to review challenges to the favor,(129) the New York courts also began to adjudicate challenges for bias other than those biases founded upon a juror's preconceived opinion about the evidence in a particular case.(130) Although the language of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed the use of the expurgatory oath only to purge biases as to guilt or innocence,(131) the New York Court of Appeals permitted other forms of bias to be purged by the oath.
In essence, a juror who expressed any bias that might affect his verdict, whether or not directly touching on guilt or innocence, was required to swear both parts of the expurgatory oath to avoid disqualification.(141) Even if he did so, both trial and appellate courts were entitled to look beyond the words of the oath and determine, from the entire voir dire, whether the prospective juror's testimony was sufficiently unequivocal and sincere.(142) Moreover, an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause resulted in automatic reversal if the defendant subsequently exhausted his peremptory challenges.(143)
The most striking variation between the Criminal Procedure Law and the statute it replaced,(159) however, was its elimination of the expurgatory oath.(160) The drafters of the statute specifically excluded the prior provision which allowed jurors who had formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence to be seated by taking an oath in the form provided by the statute.(161) Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted in People v.
Another major flaw in Frye's study is his reductive conception of a "universal" Shakespeare, universal not in the classical sense of representing the essential forms of "nature," but universal in the expurgatory
sense of being an uncontroversial poet, undetermined by any theological system, and "equally accessible" to Christians and virtuous heathen (272).
Grendler, "Gasparo Contarini and the University of Padua"; Marion Leathers Kuntz, "Venice and Justice: Saint Mark and Moses"; Silvana Seidel Menchi, "The Inquisitor as Mediator"; Gigliola Fragnito, "The Expurgatory
Policy of the Church and the Works of Gasparo Contarini"; Elena Bonora, "The Heresy of a Venetian Prelate: Archbishop Filippo Mocenigo"; Anne Jacobson Schutte, "Legal Remedies for Forced Monachization in Early Modern Italy"; and John W.