No provision in a statutory bill of rights is more potent--and does more to transmogrify the powers available under statutory versions into something approaching those under constitutionalised versions--than reading down provisions.
10) They can make bill of rights sceptics half long for the honesty of judges (under constitutionalised bills of rights) who strike down legislation rather than gut it of the meaning everyone knows it was intended to have (rule of law values notwithstanding).
The first is that were this to come to pass, it would look (to me, at least) very much like what the judges do under a constitutionalised bill of rights.
Those who pretend that statutory bills of rights are enfeebled versions of their constitutionalised cousins need to explain how it is that Parliament really does keep the last word when the judges are prepared either to rewrite legislation (a la Ghaidan) or to ignore it in favour of older legislation (a la Pora).
In the absence of any power to strike down legislation (as per constitutionalised bills of rights as in the US and Canada), and assuming (optimistically in my view) that the judges will not go too far down the Ghaidan/Pora path of preferring to use the reading down provision, it is precisely these judicial declarations that are supposed to give rise to all the benefits proponents of statutory bills of rights predict.
In Canada, with its constitutionalised Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that nevertheless contains an override, the elected federal Parliament has not used that override--not one single time--in the 24 years of the Canadian Charter's existence.
Perhaps, though, that can be ignored as what flows from a constitutionalised model (or so, at least, we regularly are reassured).
Of course in the case of Canada, with a constitutionalised bill of rights, such a provision makes sense.
46) The US has a constitutionalised bill of rights but no abridging provision.