Wherein lies the causal agency of ideology, of history, of political belief?
This leads to my critique of Gutas' first challenge: that religious traditions have no causal agency because they are not monolithic.
I believe part of the problem is that the nouns "religion" and "tradition," along with their various exemplars--Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism--compel us to search for some thing in the world, some entity that exhibits direct causal agency the way any other "thing" would do.
First, MacIntyre's definition of tradition speaks to the true source of causal agency. It is not traditions, per se, at least not in some essentialist sense, that are the agents of causation in the world.
Causal agency theory stems from a belief that there is a need to move beyond self-determination as a construct and to focus on the best ways to promote people living self-determined lives (Wehmeyer, 2004).
Causal agency theory implies that the individual who makes or causes things to happen in his or her life does so for the purpose of causing an effect that will accomplish a specific end or initiate a change (Wehmeyer, 2004).
While both the social-ecological model and causal agency theory consider those involved to be causal agents actively participating in their lives, the social-ecological model places an added emphasis on the interdependence between an individual and the environment to self-advocacy.
Unlike Wilson's earlier Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds (Cambridge, 1995), which conceded that causal agency
is always local, Wilson now appears to realize that causality must be fully contextualized to best defend externalism.
We believe in the magic of our own causal agency
This is so because if that causal agency
does not produce the result Iqbal demands of it (scientific investigation on the part of all Muslims), the very truth of the religion may be called into question.
According to a causal agency analysis, responsibility ascriptions credit a person (or a thing) with a role in bringing about an event or state of affairs, and nothing more.
Attributions of moral responsibility that move beyond ascriptions of causal agency may take either of two forms.
(6.) Of course,the judgment "X is responsible" might capture both the idea of having responsibilities and the idea of being agent-responsible, just as it might convey the ideas of causal agency and of accountability.