"A single global market," he writes, "is the Enlightenment's project of a universal civilization in what is likely to be its final form." In an invidious and oft-repeated comparison, he portrays global capitalism and the now-defunct ideal of collectivism as two sides of the same rationalist coin: "Even though a global free market cannot be reconciled with any kind of planned economy, what these Utopias have in common is more fundamental than their differences.
Meanwhile, Gray argues, in familiar globalphobic fashion, that the world economy today follows a kind of "Gresham's Law," in which "bad" capitalism drives out "good." "Sovereign states are waging a war of competitive deregulation, forced on them by the global free market," he writes.
Through all his zigs and zags, he is steadfast in his loathing of American-style capitalism as it has emerged during the past couple of decades.
Gray argues that in the United States during the 1980s and '90s, "market utopianism" has displaced "Rooseveltian liberalism" and "gone far towards establishing itself as the unofficial American civil religion." Hyperbole aside, Gray is correct that American capitalism has undergone a fundamental shift in recent years.
 It signals in addition the resolution of the challenge to capitalism on these multiple fronts.
Capitalism was ordinarily understood as the preferred path, but modernization theorists were most often political liberals who conceded that capitalism had costs and capitalist growth was difficult to achieve in less developed societies.
What made modernization theory so attractive during the first quarter century of the Cold War were three basic features: it provided scholars and policymakers with some genuine purchase on the very real and extremely dramatic social changes through which all societies seemed to be passing; it offered a relatively non-threatening reading of the conflict between capitalism and communism which nevertheless held our the prospect of the ultimate triumph of liberal capitalism; and, finally, in the hands of development experts it could be fashioned into a program of non-communist progress.
 The great virtue of totalitarian theory was that it seemed to apply as well to fascism as to communism and thus offered itself as a reasonably economical explanation for the two great threats to liberal capitalism. In so doing, of course, it deliberately ignored the utterly contrasting ideologies which motiva ted the two movements and obscured the differences in their social origins and bases of support and in their effects upon social and economic structure.
In the Communist Manifesto, there is a striking and prophetic image of capitalism spreading throughout the world, battering down all Chinese walls, as Marx and Engels put it.
Now I'll come back to this in a minute, and to why, paradoxically, the localized quality of Marx's analysis makes it more, not less, relevant to our current condition, even though, or precisely because, capitalism is so universal.
My main point is this: nearly every major development of Marxism in the 20th century has been less about capitalism than about what is not capitalist.
For instance, the major theories of revolution were constructed in situations where capitalism scarcely existed or remained undeveloped and where there was no well developed proletariat, where the revolution had to depend on alliances between a minority of workers and, in particular, a mass of pre-capitalist peasants.
Readers looking for an exegesis that lays bare the illogic and horrors of capitalism will be disappointed by The Seven Cultures.
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars deduced that each of the seven cultures of capitalism that they studied - the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands - has unique cultural habits and traditions reflected in their economies and social systems.
For example, under the hyper-individualist brand of American-British capitalism, poverty is a sign of personal failure, idleness, and disgrace, the poor are culpable.