However, when multiple parties are involved on the demand side, it is harder to arrange a mechanism to compensate the assuror.
It is highly unlikely that more than one assuror will provide the CA product as it is inconceivable that the assuree will tolerate the intrusion of having yet another firm install real-time monitoring of its transactions.
Since the large fixed cost of installing a real-time CA system is mostly sunk, it becomes crucially important whether the assuror or the assuree absorbs this cost.
As CA moves beyond the mandated audit and addresses issues other than adherence to GAAP, profound questions will arise as to the legal position of the assuror.
While the assuror brings to the table the knowledge, reputation, and tools to make assurance possible, assurance itself is essentially an overlay on the company's proprietary information.
There is an implication in some of the literature on CA that the assuror will be in a position to produce and sell all manner of innovative CA products, including comparisons between firms.
The assuror may suggest ways of sharing profits with the assuree, and may also add value by suggesting new types of transactions whose cost can be lowered by assurance, but the assuror may not be able to market such products on its own.
This example raises the point that we take up next, that as with the mandated financial statements audit, assuror independence is a critical aspect of a feasible CA environment.