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Synonyms for truth

Synonyms for truth

freedom from deceit or falseness

the quality of being actual or factual

Synonyms for truth

a fact that has been verified

conformity to reality or actuality

the quality of being near to the true value

United States abolitionist and feminist who was freed from slavery and became a leading advocate of the abolition of slavery and for the rights of women (1797-1883)

References in periodicals archive ?
But in this case the concept of informational scepticism makes the concept of moderate scepticism meaningless, given that the notion of truth in moderate scepticism is interpreted in the sense of the correspondence theory of truth.
Section I identifies and articulates a difficult problem which poses a serious threat to any theory of truth that is classified as a variant of ITT.
Our central purpose is to revisit this ideal in computer science and AI, expose it as a fallacy, and begin to form a new theory of truth that is more appropriate for big data semantics.
The agent is also central for the correctness theory of truth. An oversimplified description of the correctness theory of truth could be stated as follows: An agent holds some information I that may be 'polarized' into a purely semantic component (semantic content) Q and a binary evaluation (an alethic parameter) A0/1.
For example, although epistemological realism and a correspondence theory of truth have indeed been central to historic Christian theology, an unqualified insistence upon them not only obscures parts of the tradition, it can easily give the appearance of a kind of intellectual triumphalism that makes many critics of the church suspicious.
"We must learn to get along without anything at all like a correspondence theory of truth," he wrote in 1986.
Within philosophy, three classical theory of truth are determined: "correspondence theory", the "coherence theory", and the "pragmatic theory of truth" (Kvale, 1992).
A theory of truth grounded in satisfaction assignments (where these satisfaction assignments can themselves possess no more than merely instrumental status) cannot claim, in any metaphysically consequential sense, to cut the factual realm at its metaphysical joints.
Citing Habermas, Alexy rejects the correspondence theory of truth on linguistic grounds; premises cannot be judged better or worse based on their correspondence to an actual reality, but only by consensus.
[...] the thesis that a theory of truth conditions gives an adequate account of what is needed for understanding the literal meaning of utterances is, of course, much disputed, but since I have argued for it at length elsewhere, I will for the most part treat the thesis here as an assumption [...] A theory of truth, viewed as an empirical theory, is tested by its relevant consequences, and these are the Tsentences entailed by the theory [...] T-sentences thus have the form and function of natural laws; they are univerally quantified bi-conditionals, and as such are understood counterfactually and to be confirmed by their instances.
She notes that our civilization used to have a unified theory of truth and knowledge and argues, in agreement with her sources, that this unity began to unravel largely under the impact of Darwinism and the rise of the naturalistic worldview.
In his lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno sketches out the imbrication of the first two of these ideologemes, referring to them collectively as the "residual theory of truth," a reductive method in which "everything that can be regarded as ephemeral, transitory, deceptive, and illusory is left to one side, so that what remains is supposed to be indispensable, absolutely secure, something I can hold permanently in my hands" (25).
That last feature, in particular, has made (some) historians more aware of the role that language plays in their inquiries, adding to the problematization of the "correspondence" theory of truth on which history has generally relied.
Referring to the philosophical work of Donald Davidson, Fletcher explains that with a Platonic correspondence theory of truth, an object is represented when it is reconstructed according to a fully described blueprint, an exact replica or archetype, in a linear step-by-step fashion that disallows alternative paths.
Megill's tendency toward a choppy, repetitive writing style does not make his treatment of hermeneutics and the theory of truth and knowledge any less obtuse prose, this section from the first paragraph in Chapter 4, Knowledge Work: