The problem with arguments like these is that they are inductive arguments.
The underlying limitation of inductive arguments is known as the Problem of Induction.
What we loosely refer to as good judgment is, in fact, proficiency with inductive arguments gained through experience with value principles.
Accommodating the desires of a specific interest represents unethical conduct; in this case, the inductive argument is invalid as it cannot be consistent with a principle of value rationale.
The circularity of inductive arguments for induction is therefore an interlevel circularity.
Similarly, if one wishes to object to the inter-level circularity found in inductive arguments for induction, the objection rests on the fact that a request for evidence that the conclusion of an inductive argument is justified can never be satisfied so long as one pushes the problem one level back by using an inductive form of argument to "defend" induction.
Inductive arguments provide less certainty, are murkier, than deductive arguments.
the key differentiating feature then is that in a deductive argument the denial of the conclusion contradicts (is logically incompatible with) the supporting statements, while this is not true of an inductive argument.
Since I completely eschewed inductive arguments
, no definite conclusion can be drawn regarding the rationality of faith.
Compared to deductive arguments, (good) inductive arguments
are (a) non-demonstrative, (b) ampliative, and (c) non-additive.
The very first issues of the Informal Logic Newsletter, published in the late 1970s, were the site of a sustained debate concerning whether inductive arguments
could be distinguished categorically from deductive arguments and, if so, how (Fohr, 1980a, 1980b; Govier, 1980a; Hitchcock, 1980; Johnson, 1980; Weddle, 1979, 1980).
Hume's objection is that inductive arguments
are not logically valid .
So it is hard to see how he could have intended (6|double prime~) by (6), as this premiss would immediately be rejected by Hume and by anyone else who had any doubts about the justification of inductive arguments
We may not, indeed do not, know that--in Ramsey's terms--'the world is so constituted that inductive arguments
lead on the whole to true opinions', but if it is then our conviction that inductive arguments
are reliable 'is reasonable'.