This article will generally refer to FRAND commitments, unless addressing a RAND commitment in the context of a specific de jure standard.
Chief among the present problems with the system is the inability of parties to readily agree on the royalty rates covering the patents essential to practice the de jure standards (also known as standard essential patents or SEPs), and the prospect of anticompetitive effects if owners of SEPs refuse to license their patents on reasonable terms.
Again, there is no relation between these costs to produce a consortia specification that is offered to a standards organization for de jure standardization and the cost of the eventual de jure standards - the consortium wants to obtain support for the standard, not make money from the sales of the standards document.
Consortia, such as PowerOpen, X/Open, and OSF, are not in a position to produce de jure standards. What difference does it make whether the standards are de jure or de facto?
It is not truly an open system, but with a few de facto standards and a few widely used de jure standards
its has provided an enormous advantage to its users.
And yet, whether these changes depend on de facto or de jure standards
is another issue altogether.