That is, "the antinomy" consists entirely in the thesis (of classical theism) that there is a domain of existents which are not aspects or modes of the Being Whose plenteousness is without limit.
18) Accordingly, the classical axiom that God's essential nature cannot possibly admit of composition fails to provide the traditional theist with anything on the order of sufficient justification for denying that God's all-inclusiveness is a requirement of His maximal plenteousness.
to provide the essentials of a promising (albeit hardly probative) argument in support of the canonical view that maximal plenteousness does not require all-inclusiveness.
The argument purports to provide strong analogical confirmation of an intuitively attractive explication of maximal plenteousness, which no more requires that the Being who possesses it must exhaust all being than that maximal power (or maximal knowledge) requires that the Being Who possesses it must have all of the power (or knowledge) that there is.
Accordingly, paradigmatic cases of property-maximality necessarily exemplified by God (power and knowledge) seem to provide us with ample conceptual foundation for interpreting maximal plenteousness in a manner which rationally vindicates the traditional theist's subscription to the DT.
it may well be that there are no arguments with philosophically interesting conclusions (such as Maximal plenteousness does not entail ontological exhaustiveness)--be they even deductively rigorous and sound--which are probative or compelling in the sense that anyone who accepted their premisses but rejected their conclusion would be irrational or intellectually perverse.
that God's maximal plenteousness precludes the metaphysical distinctness of the "domain of Nature" from the Divine Substance?