I believe I have said enough that anyone interested in understanding this conception of inhumaneness within another moral theory should have no trouble following my examples--and no trouble getting much the same result.
We need a conception of inhumaneness that both explains what we say and helps us to understand why we say it.
If inhumaneness is a function of revulsion (rather than of simple harm or suffering), we can easily explain what causes us to suppress inhumane treatment (though not why we are justified in doing so): we do not want to be revolted.
The root idea of inhumaneness is that the conduct in question is somehow inconsistent with having the sensitivities characteristic of human beings in general.
If the list of disallowed reasons tracked ordinary morality, inhumaneness would still be a morally uninteresting category.
The inhumaneness of torture rules out that justification (or, rather, the unreliability of that reason gives us a decisive reason to rule out any act to be done for that reason).
The two theories I have chosen to illustrate how a conception of humaneness might yield an absolute prohibition of the conduct in question are, each in its own way, the ones least likely to generate an appropriate conception of inhumaneness.
The only way to justify the conduct in question is by a higher-order argument, one that shows that there is a decisive reason to revise our conception of inhumaneness to allow reasons of the disallowed sort into a justification of the conduct in question.
37) One illuminating way for an act-utilitarian to think about inhumaneness is the social analogue of a "Ulysses contract" (something that protects a moral agent from his own judgment under conditions known to make that judgment unreliable).
It's my conviction that, notwithstanding the character of many religious traditions and institutions historically and currently, religion is not synonymous with superstition and inhumaneness