In that piece, I argue that states can gerrymander
to maximize the number of districts that mirror the partisan composition of a majority of the electorate and the majority party in the state in order to ensure that state interests are represented nationally.
In the absence of an equal population requirement, however, there is no legal barrier to such a scheme without an objective standard by which partisan gerrymanders may be rejected.
Interestingly, bipartisan gerrymanders have a number of positive representational consequences, which suggests that when risk-aversion is combined with an equal population standard, partisan ambition can be checked, with small-d democratic benefits.
53) Justice Stevens voiced the notion that near-equality of voting districts would facilitate partisan gerrymanders which, the Justice indicated, should be treated the same as malapportionments:
But if racially motivated gerrymanders are unconstitutional, what of gerrymanders designed principally to minimize the relative voting strength of particular political parties and ethnic groups.
If anything, LULAC's limited majority opinion and six separate concurrences plunged partisan gerrymander jurisprudence deeper into confusion.
A three-judge panel of the district court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the plan should be invalidated as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's infamous but successful mid-decade partisan gerrymander
in Texas (which cost the Democrats six seats, twice the national gain realized by the Republicans in 2004) has set off a potential redistricting arms race.
bipartisan" gerrymanders, in which the two major parties
less than partisan gerrymanders, racial gerrymanders are, baldly,
plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders
of the past.
Moreover, once one considers some of the proposals for direct regulation made by scholars, it is not clear that these approaches would result in fewer false positives, or, in other words, invalidate gerrymanders that have federalism benefits and validate gerrymanders that are "excessive.
175) In fact, Stephanopoulos concedes that the Supreme Court, through existing doctrine, has already done a good job of policing egregious gerrymanders that are not spatially homogenous without any formal metrics.
We are all disenfranchised by Democratic gerrymanders
that carve up our communities and leave us without fair representation in the state Legislature.
If race was a predominant factor in the construction of the districts, the court ruled, they were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders