In virtue of my having special reason not to so act in this way, I may acquire instrumental reason to disfavor my killing, if that will lead me to act in the way that I ought to.
To have such a reason would be for one's wrongdoing to be worthy of greater disfavor than the wrongdoing of others, and this is just what I have argued is not the case.
In other words, what would be worthy of favor or disfavor if Jane were the only entity with non-instrumental value?
A different sort of objection focuses on my claim that viewing my murder of John as worthy of greater disfavor than George's murder of John would be objectionably self-centered and would represent an overestimation of my own importance.
Perhaps there is some other means of defending the asymmetry that one's wrongdoing is worthy of special disfavor while one's right-doing is worthy of no special favor.
But this gets us no closer to seeing why the outcome in which you violate someone's rights is worthy of greater disfavor than the outcome with greater rights violations by others.
If this is to be couched in terms of agent-relative value, by (A) it implies that the outcome in which your patient dies as a result of your intentionally injuring him is worthy of greater disfavor than the outcome in which two other patients die as a result of someone else's intentionally injuring them.
And this is because of the connection between value and worthiness of (dis)favor, and the fact that I find odd the idea that my wrongdoing is worthy of my greater disfavor than the wrongdoing of someone else.
The defender of the claim that one's own wrongdoing is worthy of special disfavor must presumably defend an asymmetry between wrongdoing and right-doing.
But even if there are reasons to be especially concerned with one's own wrongdoing, this alone does not imply that one's wrongdoing is worthy of greater disfavor.
A) For all possible outcomes in which there exist agents capable of having pro- and con-attitudes: (i) worthiness of favor is a strictly increasing function of goodness of outcomes; (ii) worthiness of disfavor is a strictly increasing function of badness of outcomes.