As mentioned above, deflationists
say that ontological debates are not substantive.
Hobbes' solution lies in his deflationist
account of the role of free will in responsibility and a contractualist position on morality: while freedom is the same across the whole natural realm, humans use it to verbally consent to membership in civil society.
Yet, a careful consideration of Peirce's often misread 'The Fixation of Belief' (1877) reveals a developmental theory of truth which is complementary to deflationist
Eli Hirsch is a deflationist
who maintains that many ontological disputes are merely verbal.
It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist
views such as Horwich's minimalist theory of truth and Field's version of deflationism.
It then goes on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist
The result is a deflationist
conception of properties: yes, they exist mind-independently (and necessarily), but their natures are exhausted by our property-invoking inferential and linguistic practices.
Papers by Robert Brandom, Dorothy Grover, Paul Horwich, and Michael Williams defend the deflationist
theory of truth, which is most accredited among the epistemic accounts of truth, claiming, namely, that the truth of a statement does not consist in an external relation to a feature of reality but in its possessing a positive epistemic status within our conceptual scheme or within our experience.