Finally, the last condition enforces the use of a stronger argument to defeat an argument which acts as a blocking defeater
We need not take a stand on this issue here because D only requires that my awareness of peer disagreement function as a defeater
when I have no further beliefs that serve as reasons for my belief.
1]] may add literals that allow the construction of new defeaters
for the preconditions of [A.
The idea here is that design can be directly perceived and that this can give rise to a non-argumentative basic belief that is warranted, since it has no serious defeaters
8) If it would take a cosmic coincidence for ethical intuitions to accurately track ethical facts and properties, there is a defeater
for these intuitions: the defeater
from cosmic coincidence.
and Higher-Level Requirement, MICHAEL BERGMANN
The wff B:q should be a defeater
for ,A:h, that is, it should be the case that B:q defeats ,A:h).
Besides its rigor, it is also impressive in scope, as Bergmann provides interesting discussions of connected topics like epistemic deontology, justification defeaters
, epistemic circularity, skepticism, and the new evil demon problem.
That said, belief in tense and temporal becoming as real is universal and enjoys the status of being an intrinsic defeater
to speculative B-theoretical arguments.
2] is called a proper defeater
for A; if neither argument is better than the other, a blocking situation occurs, and we will say that Bi is a blocking defeater
Stoljar pins the error down to three 'standard mistakes': i) we think that we are imagining a certain state of affairs when in fact we are imagining a different one; ii) we imagine a state of affairs that does not appear to be impossible and falsely infer that it is possible; iii) we are ignorant of a defeater
for the state of affairs we imagine to be possible.
Blaze will face Belfast in the second match of the nals weekend, with Hull, defeaters
of Braehead, taking on She eld.
The author argues that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle, namely, that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters
the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations.
The view derives a good part of its plausibility from Part II, the consideration of the defeaters
of ethical ascription.
5) A supporting condition is a condition sufficient in the absence of defeaters