What does it mean that we should not view characters' consciousnesses as "things in the text"?
Before arguing that the enactivist approach gives the lie to the belief, seeping through narratology and cognitive narratology in particular, that fictional consciousnesses can be represented, a linguistic caveat is in order.
For instance, in his book on the narrative representation of intersubjectivity, George Butte simply refuses to discuss the problem of reader-response, as if fictional consciousnesses could be stand-alone entities (22).
They replaced it with the relativistic notion that all consciousnesses are a function of ideology.
Mystical experiences fall into this category, but we can also see the activities of prayer and contemplation as attempts to mold the thought processes and consciousnesses of adherents.
In fact, without proper development of the internal, intensional forms of perception, we have trouble developing our external senses, our thought processes, and ultimately our consciousnesses.
I wouldn't endorse such a construal since it posits an entity above and beyond specific consciousnesses
for which there is no evidence; nevertheless, such language captures something of the feel for subjectivity and death which I want to convey.