In a communique in 1995, the GIA outlined its rationale for attacking the press:
In a communique posted in the eastern district of Algiers, the GSPC "condemned the crimes of the GIA of Antar Zouabri, which is still shedding the blood of innocent people in massacres.
According to a GSPC communique, the change in leadership was designed to "reinforce the unity of the Salafist fighters and change the doctrinal and spiritual deviations that have occurred within the Armed Islamic Group.
See Amnesty International, Algeria: Civilians Caught between Two Fires (New York: Amnesty International, 1997); idem, Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence (New York: Amnesty International, 1997); Armed Islamic Group, Communique issued 11 January 1995; idem, Communique issued 16 January 1995; idem, Communique issued 18 January 1995; idem, Al-Qital, bulletin 32 (1996); United Nations, Algeria: Report of Eminent Panel, July-August 1998 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1998).
In place of the hopeful, enthusiastic focus of the earlier communiques were calls such as the following:
If the argument can be made that the communiques served as the living, breathing Constitution for the uprising, then keeping people on task was what remained when superior forces had subjected the movement to fierce oppression.
For the UNLU, the notion of process was, likewise a crucial issue, although the communiques mirrored this understanding rather than served as a blueprint for it.
In publishing the bi-monthly calendar of actions in the communiques, the UNLU was acknowledging this relationship publicly, and the communiques came to be the written evidence of a legitimately conceived governing body, albeit restricted in the range of its actions by the policies of the Israeli military command.
Clearly the legitimacy of the UNLU as a political institution is demonstrated by the continued release of communiques which reflect/promote interests of Palestinians engaged in the Intifada.
One reflection of this is the fact that two months after the Communiques No.
That this shift would move away from the democratic processes established from the early days of the Intifada and reflected in the early communiques, however, was viewed by nearly everyone interviewed in the course of this research, as an unnecessary compromise.
As described earlier, the decision-making process operated loosely from bottom-to-top in the initial stages of the Intifada, the UNLU reaching consensus regarding the language and calls of the communiques after receiving suggestions from the popular committees.