This caused a donation shortage, inducing individual-donors and candidates to engage in circumventive activities.
The donation price ceiling was reinvigorated because of limits, disclosure requirements, and enforcement mechanisms that deterred many circumventive transactions prevalent before FECA.
These circumventive transactions' first step was a supplier marshaling unregulated political money--also known as soft money.
The second step in these circumventive transactions was using soft money to support federal candidates' campaigns.
204) Once again, money flowed around FECA's bolstered campaign-finance price ceilings, and market regulation was less effective due to suppliers' and candidates' circumventive activities.
Before the soft-money issue-advertisement circumventive transaction gained prominence, market participants reacted to FECA's then strong donation price ceiling by leaving the market.
BCRA addressed post-FECA-era circumventive transactions by banning certain types of soft money and broadening the standard for regulable communications.