To make the conditionals trivially assertible
we would: (1) substitute "it is true that p" for "p", and (2) equate truth with something to do with acceptance.
Patterson might claim that he has an appraisal/commendation, deflationist account of legal truth that commends legal propositions as true when they are warrantedly assertible
but does not have a warranted-assertibility theory of legal truth simpliciter.
95--"If" and "then," wrapped around enough content to form at least two propositions that seem to be conditionally assertible
together as antecedent and consequent, are, of course, the key denizens of this very deep work.
Given her account of content, the only sense the anti-realist can make of this is that if a sentence is true it is, in some sense, assertible.
Thus we may have reason to say that a complex sentence - a disjunction - was assertible without thereby having reason to assert the past tense of the sentence.
It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in "justified" and "warrantedly assertible
However, a formal point about assertibility rescues it: Jackson contends, for good reasons, that his theory about what makes a straight conditional assertible
applies to such conditionals only when they are not embedded in larger compounds.
To understand a statement is to know under what, circumstances that statement is warrantedly assertible
Firstly, it is natural to want an explanation of the unusability of the paradoxical sentences, and an explanation of the fact that "p" is assertible
iff "I believe that p" is assertible
; and it is natural to think that the explanation which Schulte offers is inadequate.