intension

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Synonyms for intension

what you must know in order to determine the reference of an expression

References in periodicals archive ?
I am inclined to think that the intensionality of (A) prevents a satisfactory definition of saying wholly as things are.
In all these cases, it is plausible that we have linguistic constructions which bear all the marks of intensionality (with an "s")--resistance to substitution of co-referring terms, and to classical existential generalisation.
In contrast, intensionality is inherent in the intuitionistic framework, due in part to the very meaning of the quantifiers.
I would none the less point out that the introduction of intensionality in this way at least does not change anything in the formal workings of the system.
SRL turns work into a dissident, self-absorbed intensionality.
13) But with the development of possible-worlds semantics, logicians learned how to give truth conditions for modal claims, despite the intensionality and opacity of those claims.
The essential pressupposition in Quine's neat three-step argument against quantified modal logic can nevertheless be turned around, in yet another way than Kripke's K(Q-W) formalization and subsequent philosophical interpretation of its consequences, as proving the intensionality of identity relation statements.
To proceed with intensionality as given in human cognition, we are wise, in general semantics terms, to side with extensionality.
It is one of the great ironies of twentieth century philosophy that Quine's harsh animadversions against intensionality and modality led to their fruitful formulation in terms of Quine's own method of deciding ontological questions by a discernment of the truth-relevant structure of sentences about the relevant domain.
So let's call "reduction*" the thesis that we can explain the truth of sentences built from intensional transitives (call these "IT-sentences") in terms of the truth of sentences in which the only intensionality is introduced by non-extensional sentence operators (call these "SO-sentences").
The main arguments to this effect come from the paradoxes of intensionality, difficulties involving the truth conditions of modal expressions and failures in belief contexts.
Second is that problems of intensionality and self-reference do not arise.
Therefore, any attempt to construct content out of biological function must fail to capture the intensionality of psychological ascriptions.
Remarkably, however, in his 1969 book, Dennett did not connect the "vagueness" of images with their intensionality, even though he devoted a whole chapter to the intensional and its distinction from the extensional.
See Hector-Neri Castaneda, Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method, 13 Nous 235, 235-60 (1979).