The very fact that there are two or three different standards of proof in differing legal contexts suggests, in conjunction with the argument in the previous section, that our legal practices already embrace the notion that the standards of epistemic justification
can vary according to context.
It constitutes a step logically (though not necessarily chronologically) prior to epistemic justification
But in the midst of anti-black racism, there arise powerful voices of moral and religious condemnation; voices that reveal that religious profession and epistemic justification
mean very little except when accompanied by authentic moral and religious practice; voices that transform the abstractions of the philosophy of religion into living, breathing, and doing, concrete human beings.
B) If there is some epistemic justification
for believing p, then there is an epistemic reason for believing p.
Knowledge, truth, and duty: Essays on epistemic justification
, responsibility, and virtue.
Very roughly, theories of epistemic justification
provide conditions under which it is permissible to acquire and maintain particular beliefs.
But Talisse's epistemic justification
must certainly prove ineffective when directed toward deluded epistemic agents, agents who are unable to practice the epistemic norms proper to belief (ex hypothesi for the reason that they aren't in a democratic political framework).
One interpretive error signaled out for correction in this volume is the view "taken by many philosophers" that Aquinas's five proofs for the existence of God were "intended to provide some sort of epistemic justification
I would question only the implicit separation of considerations having to do with epistemic justification
from a concern with power.
He believes epistemic justification
is dependent on the agent's perspective, including the perspective on truth based on the agent's beliefs.
At the same time, he distances himself from those Christians who seek to justify basic Christian beliefs in terms of modern secular notions of truth and epistemic justification
since what results is, in his judgment, often "the worst of both worlds" (4), i.
It is precisely in cases where the agent has such epistemic justification
that I believe an act can be excused (but not morally justified).
Yet another problem here is the proposed need for "sufficient epistemic justification
On the one hand, it seems that epistemic justification
must depend on the mental states of epistemic agents, for it is these that are under her control (questions of doxastic voluntarism aside).
The book then applies this model of the a priori to the concept of epistemic justification