We then proceed to show that, with the time deductible as a screening device, a separating Cournot-Nash equilibrium
may involve having low risks purchasing no insurance at all.
Adding to this complexity, profit under the "split markets" can be higher or lower than under the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
for the firm taking the less profitable market.
Ali (1989a) On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Distributions for Games with a Non-metrizabie Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs.
The first-order conditions imply that the firms' Cournot-Nash equilibrium
outputs are [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], and their equilibrium payoffs are:
The first order conditions, acting as reaction functions for the two firms, are solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
levels of [q.
Given the merged firm's decision to relocate to x = 1/2 - d, we can identify the new Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantities for the left side of the market line in the second stage of the game.
It is recognized that the free entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium
requires that both the zero-profit condition (i.
Three quarters of the themes are confined to cooperative games; the use of non-cooperative approach is spread over topics including Shapley-Shubik mechanism, Cournot-Nash equilibrium
, Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, communication equilibrium, and sunspot equilibrium.
This quantity game determines the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantities as a function of the tuple ([K.
Reynolds, "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
It is straightforward to show that the asymmetric static Cournot-Nash equilibrium
entails production of (a + r)/3b by the incumbent and (a - 2r)/3b by the entrant, and the Cournot-Nash profits for the entrant are equal to(10) (8) [Mathematical Expression Omitted]
Using the first-order condition of the rivals in (7), the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
output levels are given by
This model has the advantages of enabling us to tractably model continuous strategies in discrete ways and allowing us to evaluate how these strategies evolve over time relative to predetermined benchmarks like Cournot-Nash equilibrium
behavior, collusive behavior, and perfecfly competitive behavior.
A Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is a price-setting version of the more commonly known Cournot-Nash equilibrium
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium
can then be characterized as the intersection of these two reaction curves.