and permanent buy price in a single institution that captured many of the characteristics of both eBay and Yahoo
After observing the results from the first set of experiments, we decided to further explore the effects of a buy price in a setting that more closely matches that of the institution used by eBay, the current market leader in the United States.
He maintains that eBay's use of proxy bidding as well as a temporary buy price are both efforts to attract more buyers (and in turn more sellers) to the site by encouraging early bidding.
The three 10-period blocks used in the Treatment Stage allow the high, medium, and low buy price to be offered to each value pairing.
Table 3 reports six fixed-effects regressions (each row in the table is a separate regression) with comparisons of each of the buy price types to the baseline case, as well as a comparison of the two buy price types.
ij] is the price in the ith auction in session j, and PERM and TEMP represent the two different buy price types.
Second, if we ignore the auctions with a buy price of 25 and use the "BP = 50 or BP = 75" subset, the TEMP auctions also generate higher revenue than NO auctions (though significant at only 12.
In discussing a bidder's utilization of a buy price, it is important to distinguish between bidders whose use of the buy price is precluded by a low-value draw and those whose use is not.
To further quantify these effects, Table 6 presents the results of three probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if an auction ended with the buy price being accepted by the winning bidder and 0 otherwise.
From these regressions, it can be observed that buy price type is not particularly important in determining buy price utilization (the coefficient on PERM does have the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant), that utilization is more likely in those auctions with more competition in the form of two BPE bidders, and that utilization is highest for a buy price of 25 and lowest for a buy price of 75, when compared to the reference group of 50.
This figure shows the number of bids made during each of 20 equal-length intervals during the auctions, both by institution and buy price type.
Table 7 presents the percentage of auctions that are efficient across treatments and institutions, both in the aggregate and also broken down by buy price eligibility and buy price level.